When Mom moved into her last earthly home, at The Home, she could no longer walk. She had lost her husband, twice. She was losing her memory. She had given up her home. She had lost much of her freedom. We asked many people to pray for her, and I prayed that she could walk again. I prayed that she could move back to a lesser level of care. I prayed that we could play Scrabble again. I prayed for her in her times of weakness. But she wasn’t finished. She had a gift of eleven more months. She had a gift. She had a responsibility.

The first time I ate with Mom at The Home I looked at her, held her hand, and asked her to say grace. I expected her to thank God for the food, and I expected her to pray for her own needs as she recovered from surgery. But instead, I heard her say, “Father, help me to be a blessing to the people in my new home.” She had a gift of time; she had a responsibility.

Over the next few weeks, as the staff got to know Mom, sometimes they would have trouble remembering her name. Bethel, House of God, is not your typical modern name, and it took the staff, quite understandably, a while to learn it. When they couldn’t remember her name, we often heard them say something like, “You mean the nice lady who lives at the end of the hall?” That was my Mom; she was already fulfilling her responsibility.

Mother learned to meet her responsibility, “Love your neighbor as yourself.” She demonstrated a kind attitude, contentment, calmness, great appreciation for everyone who served her in any way.

At  The Home, they cried for Mom when she died. Those who worked with Mom, those who lived with Mom, had become part of her life. They were a blessing to each other. Their lives became raveled together with ours. Mom had a gift, she fulfilled her responsibility.

Mother, you have passed so many gifts on to those who knew you. Thank you for your gifts. If I can meet my responsibilities one-tenth as much as you did, I will honor you, your memory, and our God. Thank you, Mom, for your legacy; thank you for my inheritance.

Patti Davis, Ronald Reagan’s daughter, recently speculated on where her father might stand on same-sex marriage. Politico published her thoughts under the headline, “Patti Davis says Reagan wouldn’t have opposed gay marriage.”

The impact of the article was immediate. A quick Google search yielded multiple follow-up articles and blog posts. Liberals nationwide were off and running with a new same-sex marriage endorsement: this one from Reagan, the conservative’s conservative.

This is not the first time liberals have rushed to recast Reagan according to their policy preferences. Immediately after his death in June 2004, he was trotted out as a poster-boy for embryonic stem-cell research.

Please, not so fast.

In Davis’ defense, she starts with a crucial point about her father, one liberals had utterly refused while the man was alive: “He was a very tolerant person.”

Indeed, Reagan was tolerant — on religion, on race, on ethnic differences, on differences of opinion on many things, and also toward gays. As Davis notes, “He did not have prejudices against gay people.” Davis gives just a few of many examples.

But she then goes where I don’t think we should. She states of her father and same-sex marriage: “I don’t think he would stand in the way of it, at all. I don’t think he would stand in the way of two people wanting to make a commitment to one another.”

Davis then uses an argument that is libertarian (which Reagan was not), and which fails to understand the essence of conservatives’ objection to same-sex marriage: “I also think because he wanted government out of peoples’ lives, he would not understand the intrusion of government banning such a thing. This is not what he would have thought government should be doing.”

The problem with that statement, applied to the same-sex marriage debate, is this: Conservatives object to the federal government rendering unto itself the unprecedented ability to redefine marriage. Such is a massive step toward government intervention (one that should worry libertarians), toward powerful government, toward big government — not restrained and limited government.

It is a step that breaks entirely new ground in not only American history but human history, one with unimaginable and extraordinary effects yet to come on the family, the culture, the economy, government services and (among others) the court system.

The essence of conservatism is to preserve and conserve time-tested values that have endured for good reason and for the best of society and for order. Conservatives — which is what Reagan was — aim to conserve. By their nature and definition, conservatives do not rush into radical changes or what they fear may be another fad or fashion or popular demand. They also, by their definition, ground their ideals in both natural law and biblical law.

I know that secular liberals don’t want to hear religious arguments against same-sex marriage, but, if we’re talking about Reagan (and conservatives), we cannot exclude them.

Contrary to the image of him as president, Reagan was very religious and would not have so easily consented to a culture suddenly demanding the right to redefine what the scriptures (Old Testament and New Testament) say clearly about a man and a woman leaving their parents and coming together to form one flesh in marriage.

Reagan’s religious roots were deep, inculcated by his mother, an extremely devout, traditional Christian, and others who profoundly influenced him in Dixon, Illinois, in the 1920s. He said that “everything” he learned about the values that shaped his life and presidency he learned back in Dixon. It was his “inheritance,” one that never left him. Needless to say, Reagan did not learn to support same-sex marriage in Dixon.

Moreover, Reagan was unwavering in his conviction of the importance of a father and a mother raising children and the next generation of American citizens and understood marriage as a vital bond between a man and a woman.

To cite just one example from the final days of his presidency (January 12, 1989), Reagan insisted that “we must teach youngsters the beauty of the loving, lifelong relationship between husband and wife that is marriage.”

Yes, Reagan was tolerant of gay people — as is everyone I know who opposes same-sex marriage — but that in no way means he would have advocated redefining marriage. Toleration of something certainly does not automatically translate into advocating its legalization.

We could list innumerable things that we tolerate — including from friends and family and loved ones — but wouldn’t argue legalizing. Even then, that’s not quite the issue. The issue, after all, isn’t whether homosexuality should be legal (no one objects to that) but whether marriage will now begin a long process of continual redefinition.

It’s a form of intellectual laziness for liberals/progressives to reflexively assume that anyone who disagrees with them on redefining marriage is a recalcitrant bigot with no possible legitimate reasons.

After all, same-sex marriage opponents are adhering to the prevailing definition of marriage according to its literal and ancient roots; they believe in the cross-cultural norm that humanity has adhered to since the dawn of humanity, to a human understanding as old as the Garden of Eden. It’s remarkably short-sighted to dismiss them as hopeless bigots.

That brings me back to Ronald Reagan.

It’s funny, people on the political left spent eight years calling Reagan a bigot. When liberals weren’t denouncing him as an unregenerate racist — the single most unfair charge unceasingly flung at Reagan — they were saying that he didn’t like gay people and did nothing about AIDS because he was happy to let gays die.

Davis remembers this well, as she does the vicious accusation that her father was a nuclear warmonger. To say that liberals were unhinged in their nastiness to Reagan is insufficient. Now, in his death, they’d like to remold him in their own image, crowning him a poster boy for same-sex marriage.

The simple truth is that Reagan was a committed and principled conservative who had thoughtful and firmly grounded reasons for his positions. That, too, ironically, is a fact that liberals ignored, caricaturing Reagan as an idiot, a simpleton, an “amiable dunce,” as Clark Clifford famously called him.

He would not have merrily hopped on the same-sex marriage bandwagon without first carefully considering how the issue fit with his understanding of the laws of nature and nature’s God, of the first things and first principles that conservatives of Reagan’s generation spent years discussing at great length in their books and publications and conferences.

Could we at least agree on this much?

Reagan was silent on same-sex marriage, as was everyone of his generation. He, like all liberals of his time, could not have conceived of same-sex marriage, and he, like the entirety of the Democratic Party just a decade or two ago, unwaveringly supported traditional marriage.

Let’s leave it at that.

Sunday, April 28, marks the 255th anniversary of President James Monroe’s birth in 1758.

Recently, I had the pleasure of reading one of Harlow Giles Unger’s thorough biographies of key figures in the era of America’s founding. In reading “The Last Founding Father: James Monroe and a Nation’s Call to Greatness,” I found myself wondering: How have we let this great patriot become a forgotten man?

Monroe’s military service alone made him a hero. When he was 18 and newly matriculated at William and Mary College, and the Second Continental Congress proclaimed the Declaration of Independence, he suspended his education to enlist in the Virginia infantry.

He arrived in New York to find that the British army had just decimated Washington’s army at Harlem Heights—having killed 1,500 out of 5,000 troops. Two days later, Monroe and his fellow Virginia sharpshooters repelled a British advance, marking the first time in the War for Independence that Americans had whooped the British, forcing the redcoats to turn tail and run for their lives.

Monroe played a key role in Washington’s famous 1776 Christmas night sortie across the Delaware River. The teenaged Monroe was the co-leader, with one of Washington’s cousins, of an advance party of 50 that had crossed the river ahead of the rest of Washington’s troops, and then captured the two strategically placed cannons that defended the Hessian military camp outside of Trenton. Though seriously wounded by a musket shot, Monroe stood his ground, repelling repeated Hessian attempts to recapture the big guns, thereby saving many American lives (including, possibly, Washington’s), and thereby making that indispensable, resounding victory possible.

During the War of 1812, 38 years later, Monroe was in his mid-50s. At that time, he was serving in the Madison administration as both Secretary of State and (after a disastrous performance of his predecessor had almost resulted in total defeat) as Secretary of War. Inheriting a dire military situation in 1814, Monroe virtually single-handedly altered the course of the war. He rallied the country’s disorganized military forces, developed a country-saving military strategy, and personally led American troops from horseback from dawn until dusk—which prevented the total collapse of American resistance to the British by dint of his courage, inspirational leadership, and military genius.

Monroe’s marriage was one of the great love stories in presidential history. He and Elizabeth—who might have been the only First Lady more beautiful and glamorous than Jackie Kennedy, and who displayed heroic courage by intervening in the nick of time to save Lafayette’s wife, Adrienne, from the guillotine—shared a decades-long tender and devoted mutual love.

James Monroe may hold the record for the highest number of offices held during his career in public service. He was either elected or appointed to the following offices: 1782, Virginia legislature; 1790, U.S. Senate; 1794, Minister to France; 1803, Minister to France and Spain whose initiative resulted in the Louisiana Purchase; 1803, Minister to England; 1810, elected to the Virginia legislature a third time; 1811, elected governor of Virginia a fourth time; 1811 becomes U.S. Secretary of State; 1812-13, named acting Secretary of War and in 1814, actual Secretary of War while also remaining Secretary of State; 1816, elected president; 1820, re-elected without opposition—the only American other than George Washington to stand unopposed for the presidency.

It is that last accomplishment—being elected without opposition to the presidency—that is most remarkable. After the bruising election campaign we recently passed through, we may wonder how it was possible that nobody bothered to run against Monroe. Yes, he was an exceptional man, but even great men have enemies.

I think the reason Monroe ran unopposed was that nobody at that time felt threatened by the federal government. In 1820, Uncle Sam was still confined to original duties of keeping Americans safe and upholding contracts and property rights. In other words, in the minds of free Americans, there was neither a handout to be gained from the federal government nor the threat of confiscation of a portion of one’s property for redistribution to special interests. In short, the government was limited, unobtrusive, and benign.

Today, by contrast, the federal government is a predatory aggressor against property rights, and myriad special interests engage in an angry, perpetual battle to see who can take what from whom. Monroe had the good fortune to be president when America was America and not this sorry variation of a demoralized European welfare state.

The amazing life story of James Monroe, the fifth president of the United States, would not be complete without mentioning that he passed from this world on the Fourth of July, 1831—five years to the day after his fellow presidents Adams and Jefferson. What a fitting conclusion to the life of a principled patriot who gave his whole adult life to serving his country and upholding our most noble ideals.

Perhaps the act of stepping on a piece of paper is mundane and insipid in the 21st century. When I walk across the courtyard of the college where I teach, I step on bricks that bear the names of donors, administrators, colleagues, and students. Indeed, I even step on Christian symbols. Several decades ago when I visited St. Giles Cathedral in Edinburgh, I sought the burial marker for the reformer John Knox, but I was unable to get a clear view because of the vehicle that was parked atop it.

The act of stepping on the name of Jesus, however, is historically significant. In particular I recommend Shusaku Endo’s novel, “Silence.” In this historical novel, the author depicts a missionary’s dilemma. Is it permissible for me to step on the name of Jesus, and hence symbolically denounce my faith, when my refusal to do so will cause terror, torture, and even death on local believers in the village? I highly recommend the novel; I have read it several times.

The Florida Atlantic faculty is currently suggesting that the administration’s handling of the situation has compromised the instructor’s academic freedom. On the one hand, I agree; on the other hand, I’m not convinced.

The latest news coverage indicates that the instructor is still waiting to learn whether or not his contract is being renewed. If the administration decides not to renew his contract, on the basis of this classroom exercise, the instructor deserves a full and complete hearing. Unless due process is followed, his academic freedom has been compromised.

On the other hand, however, I’m not convinced that the exercise is best depicted as a threat to academic freedom. At InsideHigherEd.com, academic freedom is defined first and foremost as relating to intellectual debate and intellectual commitments. The engagement of this exercise in class moves the activity from intellectual debate to a behavioral dilemma.

The exercise of a class of students being asked to write “Jesus” on a piece of paper and then stepping on it is a ridicule of religion to some, and indeed at least one student complained. Academic freedom does not give the instructor the right to ridicule a student’s faith. However, this exercise is larger than academic freedom. It is better discussed as an issue of civility.

The claims of Jesus are such that this exercise is not a threat to his dominion. Nevertheless, it communicates a lack of respect for others. Such lack of respect, when conveyed by an instructor, is a lack of civility. Demonstrating civility in the public arena is more critical than ever. The failure to do so will alienate students. Recent events in Boston suggest that some of our students may be living on the margin. We want them to see and experience the best of academic freedom and the liberal arts. When professors abuse their academic freedom, and ridicule (either explicitly or implicitly) the views of their students, their lack of civility is a disservice to our modern society.

A healthy classroom engages students in a rich debate of ideas. It should not encourage students to perform symbolic gestures that ridicule the beliefs of others. This instructor should apologize for his lack of civility and then continue his task of educating his students.

Editor’s note: A version of this article first appeared at Forbes.com.

“Am I creating wealth, or am I engaging in rent-seeking behavior?” If this question would be asked during a course of business ethics at George Mason University (GMU), few would be surprised. “Rent-seeking” is a term used often in “Public Choice” economics, and GMU has been the home of an academic center with that focus. The question, however, also appears in one of the most relevant publications released by the Vatican. That indeed is a surprise.

GMU had the late Nobel Laureate James Buchanan and still has Gordon Tullock on its faculty, two great pioneers of the discipline. In 1967 Tullock wrote “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft” and later, in 1974, Anne Krueger (the former chief economist of the World Bank) coined the word “rent-seeking.” As “rents” can be legitimate, I prefer to use “privilege seeking.”

Allow me to turn back the clock to three decades ago, when I received a surprising call. The Argentine Ambassador to the Vatican, Santiago de Estrada, who did not share my hardcore free-market views, asked me if I could visit with him. He was back in Buenos Aires for a short visit. As a young professor, and one of the few classical liberal professors at the Catholic University, I had started writing about the need for the Church to develop a new understanding of free enterprise.

Ambassador Estrada shared my concern. If I recall correctly, this is what he said: “I have been at meetings of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. There is a sense of inefficacy; the economic teachings sometimes focus on aspirations, worthy goals, but seldom offer something more.” His legitimate concern was not the rich anthropology taught through the centuries by Christian churches, but the effort to give guidance to business and economic leaders. The aforementioned Council is in charge of that task and the one which released the document mentioning rent seeking.

It takes time for Catholic doctrine to incorporate evolving economic consensus. In 1987, John Paul II, at a major speech at ECLAC, the Latin American economic think tank of the United Nations, spoke in favor of private enterprise: “The challenge of poverty is so great that in order to overcome it, we must make the greatest possible use of private enterprise, with its potential effectiveness, its capacity to use resources efficiently, and the abundance of its energies for renewal.”

Years later, in John Paul II’s encyclical Centesimus Annus, the Church endorsed the concept of a free economy under a rule of law. In point 42 of that document the Pope wrote that: “If by ‘capitalism’ is meant an economic system which recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector, then the answer is certainly in the affirmative, even though it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of a ‘business economy,’ ‘market economy’ or simply ‘free economy.’”

On other occasions, John Paul II spoke very highly of the role which entrepreneurs play in society: “[T]he degree of well-being that society enjoys today would have been impossible without the dynamic figure of the entrepreneur, whose function consists in organizing human labor and the means of production in order to produce goods and services. Without any doubt, your task is the first order for society.”

Today, most of the topics dealing with economics and free enterprise are handled by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. Its work is conducted in consultation with experts from different social disciplines. It organizes seminars and releases different documents. Publications from the Catholic Church have different degrees of authority, and—in this new era—statements range from encyclicals to Twitter postings.

The Pontifical Council has been releasing “Notes” and “Reflections.” One year ago, it released a 30-page booklet, “Vocation of the Business Leader: a Reflection.” No other document from the Vatican has focused so much on the role of business leaders and entrepreneurs. It is intended “to be an educational aid that speaks of the ‘vocation’ of the business men and women who act in broad and diverse business institutions.”

In this booklet, the Council acknowledges the legitimate role “of profit as an indicator that a business is functioning well. When a firm makes a profit, it generally means that the factors of production have been properly employed and corresponding human needs have been duly satisfied. A profitable business, by creating wealth and promoting prosperity, helps individuals excel and realize the common good of a society.” The document recognizes the existence of crony capitalism and corruption and regards them as violations of principled entrepreneurship. It continues the tradition that sees businesses, in the language of John Paul II, as legitimate expressions of freedom. “Business leaders have a special role to play in the unfolding of creation—they not only provide goods and services and constantly improve them through innovating and harnessing science and technology, but they also help to shape organisations [sic] which will extend this work into the future.”

The Vatican is not and should not be a center for the promotion of concrete free-market or interventionist solutions. The Church does not have “technical solutions to offer or models to present”—that is the role of lay persons. For those of us who favor a “free economy,” it helps to have outstanding economists, such as Nobel Laureate Gary Becker, as a member of the Pontifical Academy of Science. But economists of different persuasion are also part of the debate and influencing publications.

Cardinal Turkson, from Ghana, is the current head of the Council. It has Flaminia Giovanelli, in one of its leadership positions. She is one of the highest lay persons in the Vatican. Another one is Harvard University Professor Mary Ann Glendon, the first female president of the Pontifical Council of Social Science. Cardinal Turkson is familiar with the think-tank world, such as the efforts of the Institute of Economic Affairs in Ghana. Prof. Glendon knows the U.S. scene well. With the likelihood that Pope Francis will use his many pastoral charismas beyond the walls of the Vatican, I expect that each Pontifical Council, many working as think tanks and educational centers, will rise in profile. Pope Francis will take care of the faith. The economic views that come from Vatican documents will depend more and more on a fruitful dialogue between those of us in the laity, both Catholic and non-Catholics like Gary Becker, and the leadership team of each Council.

If the issue were a religious issue, it would be difficult to account for the prevalence of the civil recognition of marriage in so many religiously diverse nations. Secular nations such as France and the former Soviet Union recognized marital unions; Buddhist and Hindu nations recognize marital unions; Islamic countries recognize marital unions. If recognizing opposite-sex unions were merely an expression of religious faith, why would Joseph Stalin’s USSR have done so? Why would France do so? State recognition of certain unions is a civil issue, regardless of whatever religious (or irreligious) opinions exist regarding those unions themselves. And a great variety of differing governments have recognized the union of a single man and a single woman for some reason that must, therefore, be non-religious.

I suspect the primary consideration that has motivated such a diversity of states to recognize heterosexual unions between one man and one woman is because this is the ordinary biological way in which new taxpayers (and soldiers, etc.) are created. Governments do not (yet?) have the power to create new humans to pay taxes in the future and to participate more broadly in the culture. They are dependent upon the biological union of males and females to secure a national progeny, and, for this reason, they recognize and protect such unions by issuing licenses. Now, there may be a host of religious reasons for being happy that states do this; but the states do not do so for religious reasons. Secular as well as non-secular states do so for the common reason that this is the ordinary way in which new citizens enter the state and are reared to maturity. That is, to put it crassly: the state has an interest in preserving and promoting the biological unions by which, ordinarily, new citizens enter the public arena.

We would do well to remind ourselves: We are not discussing whether consenting adults may have sexual relations as they wish; that matter has been settled (in the United States) since the Texas Supreme Court decision. We are discussing which unions the state ought to recognize. I am suggesting that, unless and until the state can procure a future progeny by another means than the union of a male and female, it would be imprudent for it not to recognize, and therefore protect, this particular union. And, I further suggest that the conversation we ought to be having is this: What similar benefit does state recognition of same-sex unions bring to the state, which would warrant the clerical and judicial costs to the state?

I myself remain open to a convincing conversation here, but I do not hear or read anyone making it. It should not be difficult to determine what it currently costs the individual states (or their aggregate) in clerical and judicial expenses to recognize those marriages that they now recognize. Nor should it be difficult to calculate, therefore, the “per-union” cost to the state recognizing unions. The conversation should then turn to the “return” the state would likely get for this expense.

I do not suggest that other, social costs should be exempted from the conversation. Since the state is also concerned for the general welfare of its citizens, it is appropriate for it to consider these other costs also (e.g., how this would impact the insurance industry, the profitability of various commercial enterprises). At a minimum, however, I think proponents of same-sex union should convince those of us who are convince-able that the state will sufficiently benefit from the proposed decision to undertake its expense.

As it is, I expect to remain unconvinced and unsupportive of the efforts of those who promote state recognition of same-sex unions; not because I am unwilling to listen to arguments that I regard as pertinent, but because I despair of anyone making such arguments. I’ve declared the terms that would convince me (i.e., demonstrate that the cost/benefit ratio would be in the state’s interest), but in our present climate, I would be surprised if anyone will take up the offer and assist me. The temptation to rally the already convinced by the politics of ressentiment or the confusing of rights and privileges will probably prove too great; and I (along with my Mormon friends) will continue to watch wistfully from the sidelines.

Editor’s note: This is Part III of a three-part series on same-sex marriage. See Parts I and II here:

Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, Part I:
The Politics of Rights and “Ressentiment”

Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, Part II:
Distinguishing Rights and Privileges

For the civil authorities to protect my marital union with another individual—by making public record thereof and by permitting me access to the courts to resolve any issues that may occur if that union dissolves—is not a right; it is a privilege. If the government chose not to make a record of any marriages at all, none of us could say his or her rights had been violated. In fact, in a chapter titled, “Privatizing Marriage,” taken from their book, “Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness,” Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler have proposed the matter of the state recognizing no unions. The authors suggest that this could be done without judicial appeal or action at all, by mere legislative activity. They appear, therefore, to concur with me that, at the present time, the Constitution does not guarantee to anyone a “right” to have any marital union recognized by the state.

In such a scenario, I could still be united to my wife, with or without any state recognition of that union (and indeed, many states have provision for what they call “common law marriage” when no such state recognition has been made). Whether the state recognizes my union with my partner or not is irrelevant to my right to enter such a union, which is proven by the fact that many people “live together” without seeking such state recognition.

The state proffers to citizens a number of privileges that are not rights. The state may issue a license to an individual to drive an automobile, carry a concealed weapon, operate heavy equipment, or install plumbing or wiring in a house; but it does so, in each case, on its terms, and only when the individuals satisfy those terms. If an individual continues to fail his driving exam or his plumbing exam, he cannot claim that a “right” has been violated; he may have a right to redress his grievance, and he may have a right to petition for the license, but he has no right to be assured that the state will grant the license. In some states, only a certain number of plumbing or electrical licenses may be issued annually. Would-be-plumber Bob may believe this is arbitrary, and he may petition the legislature for legislative relief in the matter, but he could hardly claim that a right had been violated. Virtually by definition, any licensing agency of any sort has the right to determine the criteria by which its licenses are issued. A marriage license is no different. If the state determines that it will only issue such licenses to people in a given category (one man/one woman, as opposed to the Mormon one man/several women), the individual cannot reasonably claim that his rights have been violated. Now, if a constitutional amendment were passed, guaranteeing a marriage license to any consenting adults who applied, the argument could then be cogently made.

Proponents of same-sex marriage often use language that is a little untruthful here. They often say, “I only desire the freedom to do as I wish with my life,” when in fact, they wish something in addition. They wish the state to take an action also; to take the action of issuing a license and making a public record of their union, and potentially to take the action of hearing and adjudicating a divorce proceeding. So, in point of fact, they wish not only their constitutional right to do as they please; they wish the state to make public record of one of the things they desire to do. And again, whether this desire should be granted by the state is not my point here; my point is that it is not truthful to declare that you merely wish to do something yourself when you also wish another entity (the state) to do something, too.

Editor’s note: This is Part II of a three-part series on same-sex marriage. See Parts I and III here:

Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, Part I:
The Politics of Rights and “Ressentiment”

Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, Part III:
The Issue Is Civil, Not Religious

In his recent book, “To Change the World: The Irony, Tragedy, and Possibility of Christianity in the Late Modern World,” James Davison Hunter lamented the exaggerated role of ressentiment in political discourse:

His (Nietzsche’s) definition of this French word included what we in the English-speaking world mean by resentment, but it also involves a combination of anger, envy, hate, rage, and revenge as the motive of political action. Ressentiment is, then, a form of political psychology .… Ressentiment is grounded in the narrative of injury or, at least, perceived injury; a strong belief that one has been or is being wronged .… And so it is, then, that the injury—real or perceived—leads the aggrieved to accuse, blame, vilify, and then seek revenge on those whom they see as responsible .… Ressentiment, then, is expressed as a discourse of negation; the condemnation and denigration of enemies in the effort to subjugate and dominate those who are culpable.

We rarely hear people merely honestly disagreeing; it appears that nearly everyone has been injured in some way. The religious right complains that some undefined group is “taking away our nation;” proponents of state recognition of same-sex unions wring their hands about their “rights” being trampled, etc. Such posturing as an aggrieved party renders civil discourse nearly impossible. We cannot easily sit across the table from someone and discuss a matter in a constructive or civil fashion if we have just accused the individual of injuring us in some way. Hunter thinks such posturing is profoundly harmful to public discourse and the public welfare, because it personalizes issues that ought to be considered in light of the public well-being, without the entanglement of emotion, passion, and personal attack-and-parry.

In the present conversation, proponents of state recognition of same-sex unions routinely suggest that their “rights” are being violated or “taken away” unless same-sex marriage is approved. Such a claim inflames ressentiment, but it adds little to the discussion, and is, in fact, erroneous. To which right, precisely, does this claim refer? Does the Bill of Rights discuss state recognition of any unions at all? Is there any legislative or judicial evidence that the right to have the state recognize our marrying whomever we wish has ever been established in legislative or judicial history? At this point, I’m not weighing in on the question of whether such a right should be recognized, but merely on the historical question of whether it ever has been recognized. If, in point of fact, it never has been recognized (more below), then nothing is being taken away, the flames of ressentiment can be extinguished, and we can discuss in civil tones whether the right, never previously-before granted, ought to be granted.

The condition of the Utah territory being admitted to statehood was its abolition of polygamy. By U.S. law, the various states (including Utah) may not legally recognize the union of more than two adults. Note how significant this decision was: It required the Mormons not to practice their religion as they (then) understood it. The decision (effectively and arguably) violated the First Amendment’s protection of the “due exercise” of their religion. It was very significant for the federal government to declare that Utah could only enter the Union if it satisfied the federal government’s limits on which marriages it would permit states to recognize. This decision demonstrates that, at least at that moment in American history, the right to the state’s recognition of our marrying whomever we wish was not, in fact, absolute; but rather, was limited by what the federal government permitted. As an undisputed fact of American history, the Utah compromise proves that government recognition of marital unions was not conceived as a right, but as a privilege—a privilege that the government had the authority to limit in accord with its own discretion.

I am not rendering an opinion here as to whether the Utah compromise was wise or not. I am merely observing that the decision was made; and that the decision is well known, and it is therefore a part of our legislative and judicial history. Technically, then, proponents of state recognition of same-sex unions should argue that their unions ought to be recognized by the state, rather than to suggest that to this point, such a “right” (to have any union recognized by the state) exists. If it were a right to marry whomever we wished, and to have the government recognize that union, then the federal government could not have imposed upon Mormons a restriction on that right.

Editor’s note: This is Part I of a three-part series on same-sex marriage. See Parts II and III here:

Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, Part II:
Distinguishing Rights and Privileges

Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, Part III:
The Issue Is Civil, Not Religious

Bill and Hillary Clinton have endorsed gay marriage, completely reversing their support of the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage as between one man and one woman, and was signed into law by President Bill Clinton.

Mrs. Clinton calls herself a “progressive.” It’s funny, I wrote an entire book on Hillary Clinton, and never once heard her call herself a “progressive.”

Well, that’s just as well. The progressive tag fits best. After all, that’s what she and other liberals are doing: they are ever evolving, changing, progressing along to something. Their positions are forever in flux, with the only commonality being that they favor more government centralization to handle perceived injustices. The evolution across issues is so vast, so unceasing, that no progressive can tell you where they will stand years from now. They merely know they’re progressing.

The marriage issue is an excellent case in point. No progressive 100 years ago could have conceived of gay marriage. In fact, merely a decade-and-a-half ago, the entirety of the Democratic Party supported traditional marriage, codified under law. And yet, Democrats turned on a dime in faithful obedience to Barack Obama’s mountaintop-message sanctifying gay marriage a year ago.

Obama promised “change” and “fundamental transformation.” His faithful supporters roared approval, projecting upon his blank screen whatever they had in mind. In Obama’s mind, this included bestowing unto himself the monumental ability to literally redefine marriage, granting himself and his government a power heretofore reserved for the laws of nature and nature’s God.

As for the Clintons, consider their change, their fundamental transformation, their progress on this bedrock issue:

As noted, in 1996, Bill Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act. The Arkansas Baptist stood for marriage as always understood.

As for Hillary, the lifelong Methodist was firmly in the camp of not rendering under government the ability to redefine marriage. Her youth pastor and mentor, the Rev. Don Jones, once said: “She is for gay rights…. But I think both she and Bill still think of heterosexuality as normative.”

Yes, they did. Campaigning for the Senate in 2000, Hillary insisted: “Marriage has historic, religious and moral content that goes back to the beginning of time, and I think a marriage is as a marriage has always been, between a man and a woman.” In 2003, she reaffirmed: “marriage … should be kept as it historically has been.” She continued that position throughout the 2008 Democratic primaries.

Alas, jump ahead to last week, where Hillary proudly proclaimed: “LGBT Americans are … full and equal citizens and deserve the rights of citizenship. That includes gay marriage.”

Gee, what happened?

Well, if you’re confused, you need to unravel the illogic of progressive ideology. By progressive thinking, the Hillary and Bill of, say, 5, 10, 15, or 50 years ago were not finished progressing. This should also mean that the Clintons were in fact wrong at each way-station in their journey to today’s progressive “truth” on marriage. Thus, too, it should mean that every Democrat who agreed with them was wrong. Current progressive ideology asserts that only current progressives are currently “right” on marriage.

Are you with me?

But here’s the kicker: How can the Clintons—or any modern progressive—know they’re right now? How do they know they’ve progressed to the “correct” point on marriage? Progress, after all, never stops progressing.

And so, for progressives, where’s their next redefinition in the ongoing process of redefining marriage? Does the evolution end with one man and one woman, or one man and one man, or one woman and one woman? Why could it not next progress to one man and multiple women? Could it involve an adult and a minor? Could their evolving redefinition include first cousins or a parent and child? Could it include multiple heterosexuals or homosexuals in single or even joint or group spousal relationships?

The answer: progressives, by their very definition, cannot answer you.

We do know, however, that progressives are happy to do with marriage what they do with everything: hand it over to the federal government. Render under government what is government’s. And what is government’s province? It’s anything progressives decide.

As for Bill Clinton, who once assured us “the era of big government is over,” he’s on board for the grand project.

Progressives might disagree with conservatives, but at least they know where conservatives stand: we look to tradition, to Biblical law, to Natural Law, to time-tested things worth conserving. We see marriage best as it has been since the Garden of Eden. We can tell you our end-goal, our ideal. Progressives cannot.

And that, ladies and gentlemen, is a train-wreck of an ideology, with literally no end to its havoc. It is currently careening into the most fundamental building block of human civilization: the family.

Great literature causes us to think and ponder; it directs us to the significant questions of life. As such, it might have multiple meanings at different levels or with different applications. What was Tolstoy trying to say?

At face value, the line never quite made sense to me. Instead, one might argue that all unhappy families are the same, where all individuals seek their own selfish ends. Only happy families allow each other to be unique and different individuals. I think I can make a strong case for the opposite quote, “All unhappy families are like one another; each happy family is happy in its own way.”

But I’m glad to let Tolstoy write the quote; he is clearly a much better writer than I. But what does he mean? After I reread Anna Karenina a few years ago (I have a rule that no novel is allowed to be on my all-time favorite list until I have read it at least twice), I took advantage of modern technology, and conducted a word search of the book for the various forms of “happy” using a gutenberg.org online version. Personally, I prefer to read paper books, but electronic tools do allow for searches that would not otherwise be feasible. Also, I apologize, but I worked with an English translation. I would so love to be able to read Anna Karenina in the original language.

I (or rather my computer) counted 367 occurrences of happy, unhappy, happiness, unhappiness, happily, etc. The three best known, of course, are in the opening line. Less known, but perhaps the most telling use of the root “happy” comes well into the book, “A man who has faith cannot be unhappy, because he is never alone.”

A full understanding of the opening line requires that it be placed alongside this quote. Tolstoy was making a statement about faith.

Tolstoy wrote Anna Karenina from 1873 to 1877—during a time of personal depression and obsession with death; his conversion to Christianity came soon thereafter, in 1878. Although his Christian thinking was not always orthodox, and certainly not always Orthodox (with a capital “O”), Tolstoy made significant contributions to Christian literature through his later works, including The Death of Ivan Ilyich, Resurrection, and A Confession.

According to an essay by Philip Yancey in Soul Survivor: How My Faith Survived the Church, Yancey credits Tolstoy (along with Dostoevsky) for enabling a Soviet Christian revival during the 1970s. The Soviet government was able to restrict access to Scripture, but failed to limit access to these two great Russian novelists, who so often exemplified their Christian faith through their writings. It would seem that Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina changed his own thinking in the 19th century and that of many Soviets in the 20th century.

Tolstoy is suggesting that there is only one way to be a truly happy family, and that is through faith. Anna pursued selfish goals and discovered unhappiness. In contrast, Levin pursued faith and found happiness. The similarity of happy families is that they are families of faith. “All [genuinely] happy families are like one another [in that they are families of faith, faith in God]; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way [in that they find their own way to idolize self, and hence end up being alone].”

Anna Karenina failed to find this happiness, but Tolstoy became a man of faith. Certainly he would spend many years struggling with many issues, including guilt over his wealth, but happiness does not suggest an absence of struggle. Rather, it suggests a focus that is beyond the self. It requires that we find a way to fill our infinite void.

Certainly, there are many Christian families who experience unhappiness, sadness, even depression. It is easy for us to lose focus on our goal. It is easy for us to succumb to physical needs and illness. We are still living as aliens in this world. Nevertheless, Christian families do have more hope. They have a focus that guides them and gives them meaning and purpose.

When my colleagues and I asked more than 200 teens about their religious faith and about their contentment in life, we found a positive relationship. Teens who expressed greater religiosity tended to indicate more contentment. A life of faith does not in any way imply that your troubles will go away, but it does ensure that you are headed on the right road.

“A man who has faith cannot be unhappy, because he is never alone.”